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Abstract—This paper presents a novel fuzzy subspace-based 
approach to hidden Markov model. Features extracted from 
patterns are considered as feature vectors in a multi-dimensional 
feature space. Current hidden Markov modeling techniques treat 
features equally, however this assumption may not be true. We 
propose to consider subspaces in the feature space and assign a 
weight to each feature to determine the contribution of that 
feature in different subspaces to modeling and recognizing 
patterns. Weights can be computed if a learning estimation 
method such as maximum likelihood is given. Experimental 
results in network intrusion detection based on the proposed 
approach show promising results.  
Keywords: subspace, hidden Markov model, pattern 
recognition, network intrusion detection. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In statistical pattern recognition, hidden Markov model 
(HMM) is the most important technique for modeling patterns 
that include temporal information such as speech and 
handwriting. If the temporal information is not taken into 
account, Gaussian mixture model (GMM) is used. The GMM 
technique uses a mixture of Gaussian densities to model the 
distribution of feature vectors extracted from training data. 
The GMM technique is also regarded as the 1-state continuous 
HMM technique. When little training data are available, 
vector quantization (VQ) technique is also effective [32]. The 
VQ technique is regarded as a special case of the GMM 
technique if covariance matrices of Gaussian have the same 
constant values. In fuzzy set theory-based pattern recognition, 
fuzzy clustering techniques such as fuzzy c-means and fuzzy 
entropy are used to design re-estimation algorithms for fuzzy 
HMM, fuzzy GMM, and fuzzy VQ [33].  
The first stage in modeling and recognizing patterns is data 
feature selection. A number of features that best characterizes 
the considering pattern is extracted and the selection of 
features is dependent on the pattern to be recognized and has 
direct impact on the recognition results. All of the above-
mentioned pattern recognition methods cannot select features 
automatically and they also treat all features equally. We 
propose that the contribution of a feature to pattern recognition 
should be measured by a weight that is assigned to the feature 
in the modeling process. This method is called fuzzy subspace 
pattern recognition. There have been some algorithms 
proposed to calculate weights for fuzzy subspace clustering [9, 
11]. However a generic framework that can apply to HMM, 
GMM, and VQ modeling techniques does not exist. 
In this paper, we propose a novel fuzzy subspace-based 
approach that can apply to all of the above-mentioned 
techniques. We consider the pattern recognition problem in 
maximum likelihood criterion. A generic objective function 
based on maximum likelihood and fuzzy c-means estimation 
is designed for the fuzzy subspace HMM and maximizing this 
function will result in an algorithm for calculating weights as 
well as HMM parameters. Algorithms for the fuzzy subspace 
GMM and VQ techniques will also be determined from the 
algorithm for the fuzzy subspace HMM.  
The proposed fuzzy subspace pattern recognition methods 
will be evaluated in network intrusion detection. Some 
preliminary experiments have been done and experimental 
results showed that the proposed approach can improve the 
recognition rates. 
II. FUZZY SUBSPACE HIDDEN MARKOV MODEL 
The underlying assumption of the HMM is that the 
considering pattern can be well characterized as a parametric 
random process, and that the parameters of the stochastic 
process can be estimated in a precise, well-defined manner. 
The HMM technique provides a reliable way of recognizing 
speech for a wide range of applications [8, 12, 23]. 
There are two assumptions in the first-order HMM. The 
first one is the Markov assumption, i.e. a new state is entered 
at each time t based on the transition probability, which only 
depends on the previous state. It is used to characterize the 
sequence of the time frames of a pattern. The second is the 
output-independence assumption, i.e. the output probability 
depends only on the state at that time regardless of when and 
how the state is entered [10]. A process satisfying the Markov 
assumption is called a Markov model [15]. An observable 
Markov model is a process where the output is a set of states 
at each instant of time and each state corresponds to an 
observable event. The hidden Markov model is a doubly 
stochastic process with an underlying Markov process which 
is not directly observable (hidden) but which can be observed 
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through another set of stochastic processes that produce 
observable events in each of the states [24]. 
Let },...,,{ 21 TsssS =  and },...,,{ 21 TxxxX = be a 
sequence of states and a sequence of continuous feature 
vectors, respectively. The compact notation },,{ BAπ=Λ  
indicates the complete parameter set of the HMM where   
• }{ iππ = , )|( 1 Λ== isPiπ : the initial state distribution 
• }{ ijaA = , ),|( 1 Λ=== − isjsPa ttij : the state transition 
probability distribution, and 
• )}({ tjbB x= , ),|()( Λ== jsPb tttj xx : the output 
probability distribution of feature vector tx  in state j. 
The following constraints are applied: 
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The HMM parameters are estimated such that in some 
sense, they best match the distribution of the feature vectors in 
X . The most widely used training method is the maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation. For a sequence of feature vectors 
X , the likelihood of the HMM is 
     ∏
=
Λ=Λ
T
t
tPP
1
)|()|( xX   (2) 
The aim of ML estimation is to find a new parameter 
model Λ  such that )|()|( Λ≥Λ XX PP . Since the expression 
in (2) is a nonlinear function of parameters in Λ, its direct 
maximisation is not possible. However, parameters can be 
obtained iteratively using the expectation-maximization (EM) 
algorithm [6]. An auxiliary function Q is used  
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where  js =1π  is denoted by jsisa == 10  for simplicity. The 
most general representation of the output probability 
distribution is a mixture of Gaussians  
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This can be rewritten as 
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where ),|( Λ== jskPc tjk , j = 1,…, N, k = 1,…, K are 
mixture coefficients, and ),,( jkjktN Σμx  is a Gaussian with 
mean vector jkμ and covariance matrix jkΣ  for the k-th 
mixture component in state j. The following constraints need 
to be satisfied 
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In order to differentiate the contribution of features, we 
propose to assign a weight αjkmw  to the m-th feature as 
follows  
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jkmσ is the m-th variance component in Gaussian k and state j, 
α
jkmw , m = 1, 2, …, M are components of an M-dimensional 
weight vector αjmw , and α is a fuzzy parameter weight for 
α
jkmw .  The weight values satisfy the following conditions: 
mw jkm ∀≤≤ 10 ,  ∑
=
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m
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1
1   (11) 
It can be seen that if all of the weight values are equal, the 
proposed expression of Gaussian distribution ),,( jkjktN Σμx  
in (9) becomes the normal expression for Gaussian 
distribution as seen in statistics and probability theory [10]. 
Maximizing the likelihood function in (2) can be obtained 
by maximizing the objective function in (3) over Λ  and the 
weight vector αjmw . The basic idea of this fuzzy subspace-
based approach is the function ),( ΛΛjQ  is maximized over 
the variable jkmw  on the assumption that the weight vector 
jmw identifies a good contribution of the features. Using the 
well-known Lagrange multiplier method, maximizing the 
function ),( ΛΛjQ  in (3) using (8) and (11) gives 
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The mixture coefficients, mean vectors and covariance 
matrices are calculated by maximizing the function in (3) over 
Λ  using (1) and (8). We obtain: 
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where the prime denotes vector transposition, and  
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The initial state distribution and state transition distribution 
are also determined: 
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The advantage of this approach is that when the weighting 
values αjkmw  have the same value, the fuzzy subspace-based 
HMM becomes the standard HMM in the maximum likelihood 
criterion. Therefore, the proposed approach can be considered 
as a generic framework and can extend to other models that 
relate to the HMM such as GMM and VQ, and other criteria 
such as minimum classification error (MCE) and maximum a 
posteriori (MAP).  
III. FUZZY SUBSPACE GAUSSIAN MIXTURE MODEL  
Fuzzy subspace GMM can be obtained by setting the 
number of states in fuzzy subspace continuous HMM to one. 
The GMM parameters consist of the mixture weight jkc , mean 
vector jkμ , covariance matrix jkΣ , and subspace weight 
jmw . The estimation equations in (12), (14), (15), (16), and 
(17) are used to calculate the GMM parameters. 
IV. FUZZY SUBSPACE VECTOR QUANTIZATION  
The VQ modeling is an efficient data reduction method, 
which is used to convert a feature vector set into a small set of 
distinct vectors using a clustering technique. Advantages of 
this reduction are reduced storage and computation. The 
distinct vectors are called code vectors and the set of code 
vectors that best represents the training set is called the 
codebook. Since there is only a finite number of code vectors, 
the process of choosing the best representation of a given 
feature vector is equivalent to quantizing the vector and leads 
to a certain level of quantization error. This error decreases as 
the size of the codebook increases, however the storage 
required for a large codebook is non-trivial. The VQ codebook 
can be used as a model in pattern recognition. The key point of 
VQ modeling is to derive an optimal codebook which is 
commonly achieved by using a clustering technique. 
In VQ modeling, the model Λ is a set of cluster centers 
},...,,{ 21 Kμμμ=Λ   where ),...,,( 21 kMkkk μμμ=μ , k = 1, 2, 
…, K are code vectors (also mean vectors). Each code vector 
kμ  is assigned to an encoding region kR  in the partition 
}{ 21 K,...,R,RR=Ω .  Then the source vector tx  can be 
represented by the encoding region kR  and expressed by 
ktV μx =)(   if  kt R∈x    (20) 
Let ][ ktuU = be a matrix whose elements are memberships of 
tx  in the n-th cluster, k = 1, 2, …, K, t = 1, 2, …, T. A K-
partition space for X is the set of matrices U such that 
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where )( tkkt uu x= is 1 or 0, according to whether tx  is or is 
not in the kth cluster, tu
K
k
kt ∀=∑
=1
1  means each tx  is in 
exactly one of the K clusters, and kTu
T
t
kt ∀<< ∑
=1
0  means 
that no cluster is empty and no cluster is all of X because of 1 
< K < T. 
The fuzzy subspace VQ technique is based on 
minimization of the ),,( ΛWUJ  function obtained from the 
),( ΛΛQ  function in (3) by removing the expressions that 
contains state parameters in HMM and Gaussian parameters in 
GMM. The ),,( ΛWUJ  function is also considered as the 
sum-of-squared-errors function (the index j for state is 
omitted) as follows 
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where Λ  is included in ktmd , which is the Euclidean norm of 
)( kt μx − . Similarly, the well-known Lagrange multiplier 
method is used to obtain the following equations for fuzzy 
subspace VQ 
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V. ALGORITHMS FOR MODELING AND RECOGNIZING 
PATTERNS  
A. Modeling Algorithm 
The modeling algorithm for the fuzzy subspace HMM 
technique is summarized as follows: 
1. Give a training data set },...,,{ 21 TxxxX = , where 
),...,,( 21 tMttt xxx=x , t = 1, 2,…, T. 
2. Initialize parameters at random satisfying (1), (8) and 
(11) 
3. Give α ≠ 1 and ε > 0 (small real number) 
4. Set i = 0 and ),()( ΛΛiQ  to a small real number. 
Iteration: 
a. Compute weight values using (12) and (13) 
b. Compute Gaussian parameters using (14), (15), 
(16), and (17) 
c. Compute state parameters using (18) and (19) 
d. Compute ),()1( ΛΛ+iQ  using (3), (6), (7), (9), 
and (10) 
e. If 
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+
+
),(
),(),(
)1(
)()1(
i
ii
Q
QQ   (27) 
set ),(),( )1()( ΛΛ=ΛΛ +ii QQ ,    i = i + 1 and go 
to step (a). 
B. Recognition Algorithm 
Assuming },...,,{ )()2()1( pΛΛΛ  are p pattern models that are 
trained using the modeling algorithm. Given an unknown 
feature vector x, the task is to classify x into one of the p 
models. The following algorithm is proposed 
1. Given an unknown feature vector x and the set of 
models },...,,{ )()2()1( pΛΛΛ   
2. Calculate the probabilities )|( )(iP Λx , i = 1, …, p. 
3. The recognized model i* is the model whose 
probability is maximum  
)|(maxarg* )(
},...,2,1{
i
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Pi Λ=
∈
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VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
We used the KDD CUP 1999 dataset [13] to evaluate the 
proposed approach. This dataset was based on MIT Lincoln 
Lab intrusion detection dataset, also known as DARPA dataset 
[5]. The data was produced for “The Third International 
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition”, 
which was held in conjunction with the Fifth International 
Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. The 
raw network traffic records have already been converted into 
vector format. Each feature vector consists of 41 features. The 
meanings of these features can be found in [30].  
The attacks listed in feature vectors of KDD CUP 1999 
dataset come from MIT Lincoln intrusion detection dataset 
web site (KDD CUP 1999). The labels are mostly the same 
except a few discrepancies. The MIT Lincoln lab web site lists 
2 types of buffer overflow attack: eject and ffb. The former 
explores the buffer overflow problem of eject program of 
Solaris, and the later explores the buffer overflow problem of 
ffb config program. Guessing user logon names and passwords 
through remote logon via telnet session is labeled as 
guess_passwd in the KDD CUP 1999 dataset, but listed as dict 
on the MIT Lincoln lab web site. Finally, we cannot find the 
counterparts of syslog and warez in the KDD CUP 1999 
dataset. In addition to the attack labels, the KDD CUP 1999 
dataset has also the label normal, which means that the traffic 
is normal and free from any attack.  
The proposed method for network intrusion detection was 
evaluated using the KDD CUP 1999 data set for training and 
the Corrected data set for testing. For training, the number of 
feature vectors for training the normal model was set to 5000. 
For testing, there were not sufficient data for all attack types, 
so we selected the normal network pattern and the 5 attacks 
which were ipsweep, neptune, portsweep, satan, and smurf. 
The testing data set contains 60593 feature vectors for the 
normal network pattern, and 306, 58001, 354, 1633 and 
164091 feature vectors for the five attacks, respectively.  
We also conducted a set of experiments for the network 
data using the normalization technique as follows 
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where tmx is the m-th feature of the t-th feature vector, mμ the 
mean value of all T feature vectors for feature m, and mσ  the 
mean absolute deviation.  
Anomaly detection rates versus false alarm rates are 
presented in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4, where the number of 
Gaussians is set to 4, 8, 16, and 32, respectively. The value of 
α was set to 4. All network data were normalized. We chose 5 
false alarm rates (in %) which were 0.0, 0.1, 1.0, 10.0, and 
100.0 to compare the corresponding anomaly detection rates 
for the standard GMM modeling and the proposed fuzzy 
subspace GMM modeling method. The ideal value for false 
alarm rate is 0.0, and from the 4 tables, we can see that the 
fuzzy subspace GMM performed outperformed the standard 
GMM modeling even with the smallest Gaussians. 
All the considered methods could not achieve the highest 
anomaly detection rate of 100% even though we changed the 
threshold value to accept all attack patterns (i.e., the false 
alarm rate is 100%). With 32 Gaussians, the fuzzy subspace 
GMM modeling achieved very good results even with the 
lowest false alarm rate. The training data set contained 5000 
feature vectors. If all training data for the normal pattern were 
used to train the model, the result would be better. 
TABLE I.  ANOMALY DETECTION RESULTS, #GAUSSIANS = 4 
Modeling False Alarm Rate (in %) 
0.0 0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 
GMM 45.8 46.2 46.9 48.7 77.6 
Fuzzy Subspace GMM 98.0 98.3 98.4 98.6 98.8 
TABLE II.  ANOMALY DETECTION RESULTS, #GAUSSIANS = 8 
Modeling False Alarm Rate (in %) 
0.0 0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 
GMM 46.2 50.1 53.2 60.1 78.1 
Fuzzy Subspace GMM 98.1 98.3 98.5 98.6 98.9 
TABLE III.  ANOMALY DETECTION RESULTS, #GAUSSIANS = 16 
Modeling False Alarm Rate (in %) 
0.0 0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 
GMM 65.9 80.2 82.5 84.3 91.8 
Fuzzy Subspace GMM 98.1 98.3 98.6 98.6 99.1 
TABLE IV.  ANOMALY DETECTION RESULTS, #GAUSSIANS = 32 
Modeling False Alarm Rate (in %) 
0.0 0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 
GMM 83.1 84.1 86.1 87.0 95.3 
Fuzzy Subspace GMM 98.6 99.0 99.1 99.2 99.5 
 
VII. CONCLUSION  
We have proposed a generic framework for fuzzy subspace-
based methods in pattern recognition. The framework has been 
presented for fuzzy subspace HMM using maximum 
likelihood estimation. We have also presented how the fuzzy 
subspace GMM and fuzzy subspace VQ can be obtained from 
the fuzzy subspace HMM. We have also applied the proposed 
methods to anomaly network detection and evaluated the 
methods with the KDD CUP 1999 dataset. The results in 
anomaly network detection showed that the fuzzy subspace 
HMM, GMM, and VQ can be used in pattern recognition. The 
selection of useful features is a very important task for any 
classifier and is worth investigating. 
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